This paper establishes a very general result on the existence of competitive equilibria for exchange economies (with a finite number of agents) with an infinite-dimensional commodity space. The commodity spaces treated are Banach lattices, but no interiority assumptions on the positive cone are made; thus, the commodity spaces covered by this result include most of the spaces considered in economic analysis. Moreover, this result applies to preferences which may not be monotone, complete, or transitive; preferences may even be interdependent. Since preferences need not be monotone, the result allows for non-positive prices, and an exact equilibrium is obtained, rather than a free-disposal equilibrium.
Introduction
Infinite-dimensional commodity spaces have become well-established in the literature since their introduction by Debreu (1954) , Peleg and Yaari (1970) and Bewley (1972 Bewley ( ,1973 . Infinite-dimensional commodity spaces arise naturally when we consider economic activity over an infinite time horizon, or with uncertainty about the (possibly infinite number of) states of the world, or in a setting where an infinite variety of commodity characteristics are possible. Many different infinite-dimensional spaces arise naturally. For example, Bewley (1972) uses the space 1, of bounded real sequences to model the allocation of resources over an infinite time horizon,' and the Lebesgue space L, of bounded measurable functions on a measure space to model uncertainty. Duffie and Huang (1985) use the space L, of square-integrable functions on a measure space to model the trading of long-lived securities over time. Finally, Mas-Cole11 (1975) and Jones (1983) use the space M(Q) of measures on a compact metric space to model differentiated commodities.
This paper establishes a very general result on the existence of competitive equilibria for exchange economies (with a finite number of agents) with an infinite-dimensional commodity space. The commodity spaces we treat are Banach lattices, and include all the sequence spaces I, (15~5 co), all the Lebesgue spaces L,, (15~5 co) and the space M(Q) of measures. Thus we allow for commodity spaces which are general enough to include most of the spaces used in economic analysis. Moreover, we allow for preferences which may not be monotone, transitive or complete; preferences may even be interdependent. Since preferences need not be monotone, we allow for prices which need not be positive, and obtain an exact equilibrium rather than a free-disposal equilibrium.
The central assumption we make is that preferences satisfy the nontransitive version of a condition used by Mas-Cole11 (1983) , which he called 'uniform properness' [and which is, in turn, related to a condition used by Chichilnisky and Kalman (1980) ]. Informally, preferences satisfy this condition if there is one commodity bundle which is a uniformly good substitute for any other commodity bundle (in appropriate quantities). This assumption is quite weak; it is automatically satisfied, for example, whenever preferences are monotone and the positive cone has a non-empty interior. (This includes all finite-dimensional spaces and the infinite-dimensional spaces I, and L,.) It also admits many natural economic interpretations; for example, in infinite time horizon models it corresponds to the assumption that agents do not over emphasize the future.
Our work is closely related to the work of Mas-Cole11 (1983) , in the sense that our crucial assumption is analogous to his. However, Mas-Collell's argument [which is related to an idea of Magi11 (1981) and Negishi (1960) ] depends crucially on completeness and transitivity of preferences. On the other hand, the arguments of Bewley (1972) , which have been generalized by Florenzano (1983) Toussaint (1984) , Khan (1984) and others, depend crucially on monotonicity (or free disposability) and on the assumption that the positive cone of the commodity space has a non-empty interior. (Of the commodity spaces mentioned previously, only 1, and L, enjoy this pro- ' The space 1, of summable sequences can also be used for such a model. Our choice between 1, and I, should be based on the sort of resources we have in mind. If we are considering a renewable resource (such as food) we should use I,, since the finiteness of the earth places an upper bound on the amount available in any time period. If we are considering a non-renewable resource (such as oil), it seems more appropriate to use f,, since not only the amount available in each period, but also the sum total available throughout time is (presumably) bounded.
perty.) Since we do not assume completeness or transitivity or monotonicity of preferences, and make no interiority assumptions on the positive cone of our commodity space, our arguments are of necessity quite different. At the heart of our proof is a price estimate which says that, at equilibrium, commodities which are very desirable cannot be cheap. The lattice framework of our paper is superficially similar to that used by Aliprantis and Brown (1983) [see also Bojan (1974) and Yannelis (1985) ]. However, these authors take, as the primitive notion, the aggregate exceess demand function (or correspondence). Since our primitive notion is that of agents' preferences, the two approaches are not comparable. It is perhaps appropriate to point out however, as Aliprantis and Brown (1983, p. 196) point out, that if the interior of the positive cone of the commodity space is empty, the equilibrium price they obtain may be zero, which is not economically meaningful. By contrast, our equilibrium prices are never zero.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is described in section 2 (in a standard way); we also give some motivation for our use of Banach lattices as commodity spaces. Section 3 discusses the economic and mathematical meaning of our assumptions on preferences.
The Main Existence Theorem is presented in section 4. We formulate this result in a very general context so that more concrete results flow naturally and easily from it. Since the proof of this result is long, section 4 includes an overview of the proof, together with a detailed discussion of the failure of more traditional approaches. We think both this overview and this discussion are important for understanding the proof.
The proof of the Main Existence Theorem is spread out over 3 sections. Section 5 contains the key economic lemma, dealing with prices. Section 6 contains the key mathematical lemma, dealing with finite-dimensional vector sublattices. Section 7 completes the argument.
We collect a few concluding remarks in section 8. Finally, the appendix reviews some standard material about Banach spaces and Banach lattices.
Economies in a Banach lattice
We formalize the notion of an economy in the usual way. Let L be a Banach lattice.* By an exchange economy with N agents and commodity space L (or simply an economy in L) we mean a set E = ((Xi, Pi, eJ: i = 1,2,. . . , N} of triples where (a) Xi (the consumption set of the ith agent) is a non-empty subset of L, (b) Pi (the preference relation of the ith agent) is a correspondence Pi: njN= 1 Xj + 2" (2xi is the set of all subsets of Xi), (c) e, (the initial endowment of the ith agent) is a vector in Xi. ' For background information about Banach lattices, see the appendix.
We frequently refer to a vector (x,, . . . ,xN) E~X, as an allocation. The interpretation of preferences which we have in mind is that yi E Pi (xl,. . . , xN) means that agent i strictly prefers yi to Xi if the (given) components of other agents are fixed; this is the usual way to allow for interdependent preferences. Notice that preferences need not be transitive or complete or convex. However, in all our results we shall asume that xi #con Pi(xI,. . . , xN) for all (x 1,. . . ,x,) E~X~ (con A always denotes the convex hulI of the set A); in particular, xi 4 Pi(xI, . . . , xN) So Pi is irreflexiue.
The graph of the correspondence Pi is a subset of ny= 1 Xj x Xi. If z is a topology on L, we shall say that Pi is (z,norm)-continuous if the graph of Pi is an open set of the product fly= 1 Xj x Xi, where we endow each of the first N factors with the topology z and the last factor Xi with the norm topology (product spaces will always be given the product topology). This is equivalent to saying that if yiEPi(xt,. . . ,xiy) then there are relatively z-open neighborhoods Uj of xj in Xj and relatively norm-open neighborhood q of yi in Xi such that yi~Pi(%,, . . . , XN) whenever yi E Vi and Xje 7Jj for each j=1,2 , . . . , N. Mixed continuity is common in infinite-dimensional settings; see Bewley (1972) for example. The topology z we shall use will be different in different settings; we refer to section 4 for further discussion.
A price is a continuous linear functional 7c on L (i.e., rc~ L'). By an equilibrium for the economy E we mean an (N + 1)-tuple (x1,. . . , x,;n) where xi E Xi for each i and n is a non-zero price, such that (i) EYE 1 Xi=J$= 1 ei, (ii) x(x,) = x(e,) for each i, (iii) if YiEPi(Xt,..., x~) then 71(yi) > x(ei) (for each i),
(Notice that we do not require prices to be positive and that we treat exact equilibria rather than free disposal equilibria.) A quasi-equilibrium3 is an (N + I)-tuple (x,, . . . , xN;rc) where xi E X for each i, and 7~ is a non-zero price, such that (i), (ii) above and the following hold:
(iii') if JJi E Pi(xI, . . . , x~) then Gus (for each i).
We have restricted our attention to continuous prices because that seems economically natural. However, in Yannelis-Zame (1984) we show that, in the context we consider in this paper, discountinuous prices can safely be ignored. That is, allocations which can be supported in equilibrium by discontinuous prices can also be supported in equilibrium by continuous prices.
'Strictly speaking, this defines a compensated equilibrium, rather than a quasi-equilibrium. However, in the presence of our other assumptions, these two notions are equivalent.
We shall say that the economy E is irreducible if: whenever I and J are non-empty sets of agents with I n J=@ and I u J= {l,. McKenzie (1959) .] We will frequently refer to a vector XE Lf as a commodity bundle. We should caution the reader that, in our abstract framework, there are no pure commodities.
Finally, we make one comment about our use of Banach lattices as commodity spaces. It might seem more natural (and less restrictive) to use ordered Banach spaces, rather than lattices, as commodity spaces. However, many economic ideas lose their natural meanings if the lattice structure is missing. Suppose for example that the economy has two agents with initial endowments e, and e2, and we consider the meaning of the statement 'the (positive) commodity bundle b is part of the aggregate initial endowment'. Presumably this should mean 05 bse, +e,. On the other hand, we should also like it to have the meaning that the whole bundle b is the sum of two parts, one of which is owned by each agent. In other words, there should exist bundles b,, b, with 0 5 b, 5 e,, 0 5 b, 5 e2 and b = b, + b,. Unfortunately, if the commodity space is not a lattice, these two statements are not equivalent. On the other hand, if the commodity space is a lattice, these two statements are equivalent (this is just the Riesz Decomposition Property).
Preferences
The purpose of this section is to discuss in detail our key assumptions on preferences and their meaning. Throughout the remainder of this section, we let E= ((Xi, Pi, ei): i= 1,2,. . . , N) be an economy in the Banach lattice L. We will assume that each of the consumption sets Xi coincides with the positive cone L+ of L (in section 8 we discuss ways in which this assumption can be weakened) and that xi$conPi(xl,..., xN) for each agent i and each (x,, . . . , xN) E njN= 1 Xj. Fix an agent i, a vector v E L' and an allocation x=(x,, . . . , xN) E n Xj. Let T:)(x) denote the set of non-negative real numbers p such that:
Xi+tV-_aPi(X1,..., XN) whenever O<tsl, (The restriction c =( xi + tv guarantees that xi + to -r~ 10 so Xi + tu -CJ E Xi = L'.) It is easily checked that r:(x) is a closed interval containing 0 and bounded above by ((v((. Definition The marginal rate of desirability of v (for agent i) at x is pi(v, x) = max {p: p E r:(x)}.
If A is a subset of n Xj, we say the vector v is extremely desirable (for agent i) on the set A if inf {pi(U, x): x E A} > 0.
Finally, v is extremely desirable (for agent i) if it is extremely desirable on
Informally, u is extremely desirable if agent i would prefer to trade any bundle 0 for an additional increment of the bundle v, provided that the size of (T (measured by [/(T//) . IS sufficiently small compared to the increment of v (measured by t). We stress that -even in those contexts where it makes sense to speak of 'pure commodities' -the vector v need not be a pure commodity; but rather a commodity bundle. Evidently, extreme desirability is a kind of bound on the relative marginal rates of substitution, where we compare u to all other bundles.
As will become clear in the following sections, existence of extremely desirable commodities (for each agent) is precisely the additional assumption we need to obtain existence of equilibria, so its seems valuable to discuss the meaning of this assumption in some detail.
Let us observe first of all that if the preference relation Pi is strictly monotone [in the sense that xi+y~ Pi(xl,. . . , xN) whenever y is strictly positive] and the positive cone L+ has a non-empty interior, then extremely desirable commodities exist automatically. Indeed, let v be any vector in the interior of L+ and choose a positive number p such that the ball B = {w E L; II v-w/I <p} is contained in the interior of L+. Now, if lloll< tp then t-'OIj</l so to-cr=t(u-t -'a) belongs to the interior of L+. (for t>O). Strict monotonicity now implies that xi + tv -CT E Pi(xI, . . . , xN). (Informally, xi + tv -0 is better than xi because it is strictly bigger.) Since the positive cone L+ has a non-empty interior for every finite-dimensional space L, and for 1, and L,, requiring existence of extremely desirable commodities imposes no additional restriction in these cases.
Extreme desirability may be given a very natural geometric interpretation. Fix a vector u in L+ and a positive number II, and let C be the open cone The vector v is extremely desirable (for agent i) with marginal rate of desirability at least ,u, if for each x in (L+)N; it is the case that yip, whenever y belongs to (C+xi) n L+. In other words, extreme desirability means that the portion of the forward cone C +xi which belongs to the consumption set of consumer i is contained in the set of vectors preferred to xi (keeping other components of x tixed).
By way of comparison, Mas-Cole11 (1983) says that the (transitive, complete, convex) preference relation ki is uniformly proper if there is a vector v in L+ and a positive real number ,U such that (xi-tu+o)zix whenever Xi~L',t>O, OWL and \\o\\<tp. S' mce it is automatically the case that (xi-tv+a)zix if (xi-tv+o)$L+, this is equivalent to saying that [( -C + xi) n L+] n (yi: yi 2 ixi} = @. Thus uniform properness means that the portion of the backward cone -C +xi which belongs to the consumption set of consumer i is disjoint from the set of vectors preferred to xi. It should be evident, then, that the existence of extremely desirable commodities is simply the non-transitive analog of uniform properness. In fact, it may be shown [see Yannelis and Zame (1984) for the easy argument] that -for transitive, complete, convex, non-interdependent preferences -the two conditions are equivalent. All of Mas-Colell's comments on the meaning of uniform properness thus apply to extreme desirability; we shall not repeat them here. Nor shall we repeat Mas-Colell's example which shows that, without uniform properness (i.e., in the absense of extremely desirable commodities), an economy may fail to have an equilibrium. It does, however, seem natural to give one example to illustrate the economic meaning of extremely desirable commodities.
Example 3.1. Let (l&5&m) be a measure space with m a positive measure such that m(Q) = 1. We wish to think of Q as representing the set of possible states of the world, so that m(E) is the probability that the true state of the world is one of the states in the set E, with E&2. We interpret a function f~ L: as representing the allocation of a single resource over all possible states of the world so that llf/=Jn f dm is the consumer's expected allocation of this one resource. Take v to be the function which is identically equal to 1, so that u represents a guarantee of one unit of the resource no matter what the true state of the world is. If ((g(( = Ja IG( dm is small in comparison with t, then x+ tv--a represents a guaranteed gain of t units of the resource in every state of the world, and a loss of an amount which, although perhaps large in some states of the world, is expected to be small (in comparison with t). TO say that the bundle v is extremely desirable (with some marginal rate of desirability) is thus to place a bound on the degree to which the consumer is 'risk-preferring'.
One further comment of a mathematical nature. Notice that the marginal rate of desirability &u,x) depends both on the bundle v and on the allocation x. As a function of x, ~~(v,x) need not be continuous, but as a function of u we have the following easy estimate which we shall need later: Proof: Let t be a real number with O<ts 1 and let CT be an element so that ((a+ tu-tw(( <tpi(u, w) . Of course this means that xi+ tw--o= Xi + tv -(a + tv -tw) belongs to Pi(X) as desired. q
The Main Existence Theorem
In this section we formulate a very general existence result from which we can easily derive concrete applications. We begin with a definition.
Definition.
A Hausdorff topology z on the Banach lattice L will be called compatible if (a) z is weaker than the norm topology of L, (b) z is a vector space topology (i.e., the vector space operations on L are continuous in the topology r), (c) all order intervals [O,z] in L are z-compact.
Note that we do not assume that the lattice operations in L are continuous in the topology 2. In concrete applications, the topology T will vary according to the underlying Banach lattice L; it may be the norm topology itself, or the weak topology, or the weak-star or Mackey topology (if L is a dual space).
Our basic existence result is the following:
Main Existence Theorem. Let E= ((X, Pi, ei) However, the Main Existence Theorem may not be applicable since it requires that the aggregate initial endowments be strictly positive, and M(Q) need not have any strictly positive elements. However, it is possible to adapt our result to cover this case -see Remark 4 of section 8 for details.
The formal proof of the Main Existence Theorem is long and involved; we defer it to the following sections. At this point, however, it is appropriate to give an overview of the proof.
It is helpful to recall the argument used by Bewley (1972) (and generalized by others) for the case L = L,. In sketch, the strategy of Bewley's proof is to consider the restriction EF of the economy E to finite-dimensional subspaces 4We have required extreme desirability on the set of feasible allocations, rather than all of (L')? since that is all we shall need, and it is a bit easier to verify in practice. See Yannelis and Zame (1984) for example.
'Note that the price rr is norm continuous but need not be continuous in the topology z. Indeed, z need not even admit any non-zero continuous linear functionals.
F of L = L, which contain the initial endowments. Standard results imply that each of the economies &F has an equilibrium (XT,. . . , x:;pF) with pF EF'. Since Bewley assumes that preferences are monotone, it is necessarily the case that pF20 and there is no loss of generality in assuming that IIpFII= 1. Since e is strictly positive, it is in fact an interior point of the positive cone of L=L,. The Krein-Rutman Theorem then allows us to extend pF to an element rrF of L' = Lb, with nF >=O and \)x~\\ = 1. The net of equilibria (x" i,. . .,xc;zF) has a subnet which converges (in the respective weak-star topologies) to (X1,. . . , X,;E). Since the functionals rcF are positive and have norm 1, non-emptiness of the interior of the positive cone implies that the (weak-star) limit functional E is also positive and also has norm 1. In particular, 2 is not the zero functional. It now follows that (xi,, . . ,X,; 71) is an equilibrium for 8.
This argument depends crucially both on the assumption that preferences are monotone and on the assumption that the positive cone of the Banach lattice L has a non-empty interior; it will not work if either of these assumptions is dropped. The problem is that we must be sure that the limit price E is not identically zero. If preferences are not monotone, we cannot be sure that the prices pF (and hence their extensions n") are positive. Since the functionals rcF only converge to 71 in the weak-star topology, however, there is then no reason to suppose that C is not identically zero. (This can happen in the dual of any infinite-dimensional Banach space, including L,.) On the other hand if the,positive cone of L has an empty interior, then the limit functional 5 may again be zero -even if all the functionals rcF are positive and have norm 1.
The purpose of this discussion is to point out that the crucial issue is to guarantee that the limit functional it is not identically zero. The central idea of our proof is to consider, not finite-dimensional subspaces of L, but rather finite-dimensional vector sublattices. For vector sublattices, we can use the extremely desirable commodities vi to obtain an estimate (which we call the Price Lemma, and isolate in section 5) which will, in the limit, guarantee that 5 is not identically zero. However, this approach creates a multitude of its own difficulties. The first difficulty is that, in general, a Banach lattice need not have 'enough' finite-dimensional vector sublattices; we take care of this in section 6 by showing that the existence of a compatible topology implies the existence of 'many' finite-dimensional vector sublattices. The second difficulty is that, even with an abundance of finite-dimensional vector sublattices, we cannot be sure of finding any finite dimensional vector sublattices which contain the initial endowments; we take care of this by constructing economies in the finite-dimensional vector sublattices which are approximations of the original economy, rather than restrictions of it. The third difficulty is that the family of finite-dimensional vector sublattices is not directed by inclusion; we take care of this by directing them by 'approximate inclusion' instead. The final difficulty lies in showing that the limiting allocation is an equilibrium allocation, since it need not lie in any of the approximating economies; we take care of this by another approximation argument.
The Price Lemma
As we discussed in the previous section, the crucial issue in our argument is that the limiting price we construct must be different from zero. To achieve this, we shall make use of the following lemma, which formalizes a very natural economic intuition: at equilibrium, commodities which are very desirable cannot be cheap. ProoJ: If this is not so, we will show how to construct vectors yi which are all preferred to the given allocation and have the property that, for at least one agent i, yi is cheaper than xi; this will violate the quasi-equilibrium conditions. To this end, we write pi=pi(vi, (x i, . . . , x,)), and suppose that C(Z(vJ/pJ < 1. Since Ijnj] = 1, there is a vector w EL such that llwll< 1 and rc(w) >~(r~(v~)/~~). Write w=w+-w-.
Since e =xe, is strictly positive, the sequences {he A w'>;=, {ne A w->~=i and converge in norm to w+ and w-respectively. Since z is norm continuous, we can choose a positive integer k so large that x((ke A w')-(ke
6Notice that the lattice L need not admit a compatible topology and that the preferences need not enjoy any continuity properties.
In this generality, quasi-equilibria need not exist (in which case the Price Lemma is certainly true). Of course, in our applications we will make additional assumptions about L and P,, but the Price Lemma seems to be of interest in itself, so we choose to give a proof in this more general setting. Since (x1,. . . , xN;n) is a quasi-equilibrium for E we have that c xi = C ei = e and Xi 2 0 for each i. Hence z' SC kxi and z-51 kxi. We can use the Riesz Decomposition Property to find vectors a,, . . . , aN, bl We assert that YiEPi(Xl,.. ., xN) for each i. This of course follows from the definition of pi as the marginal rate of desirability, provided we verify that (l/k)(ai-bi)~~i+(l/k~i)Ui and that Il(l/k)(ai-bi)ll <(l/kpJ ',u? The first of these inequalities follows from the facts that ai 5 kx, biz0 and Viz0 (for each i); the second follows from the fact that, for each i,
since /z/l < 1. We now consider the cost of the commodity vectors Yi. We cannot estimate these costs individually, but the sum is easy to estimate. We obtain
Since n(z) >C (n(Vi)/lli). it follows that 1 x(Y,) <I Z(XJ, SO that n(Yj) < X(Xj) = ,(ej) for at least one agent j. Since yjEPj(X 1,. . . , .x,), this violates the assumption that (x1,. . . , xN;n) is a quasi-equilibrium. Since we have obtained a contradiction to our supposition that complete. 0
Remark. For some Banach lattices L, we example, if L is the Lebesgue space L,, we can agent i. However, in the general framework, Price Lemma is the most that is obtainable.
C(E(XJ/pJ < 1, the proof is can actually do better. For show that z(uJ/~~~ 1 for some the weaker conclusion of the We stress that the Price Lemma depends crucially on the facts that L is a lattice and that the norm on L is a lattice norm, and may fail to be true if these assumptions are not satisfied. For example, the Price Lemma may fail if L is the two-dimensional vector lattice 1w2, equipped with a vector-space norm which is not a lattice norm.
Finite-dimensional vector sublattices
The object of this section is to prove that a Banach lattice which admits a compatible topology necessarily has a large collection of finite-dimensional vector sublattices.
(A vector sublattice K of L is a linear subspace which is also a sublattice;
we say K is a finite-dimensional vector sublattice if it is a vector sublattice and is finite-dimensional as a vector space.) We isolate the precise property we need in the following result: It is convenient to first isolate a Lemma. Recall that L is order complete if every subset of L+ which has an upper bound in L actually has a supremum in L.
Lemma 6.2. If the Banach lattice L admits a compatible topology, then L is order complete.

Proof
Let n be any indexing set and let (zJn be a family of positive elements of L bounded above by the positive element z. Let 9 be the set of finite subsets of A; for each F in Y, set zF= sup (z,: i E F}. Since 9 is directed by inclusion, the family {zF: FEN} is a net of positive elements of L; moreover, zFSz for each F, so (zr) is a net in the order interval [O,z}. By assumption, L admits a Hausdorff vector space topology z in which the order interval [O,z] is compact. Hence some subnet {zG: GE$} converges (in the topology r) to some element Z of [O,z] . We assert that Z= sup {z~}.
To see this, we fix an element F, of 9". The definition of the elements zF, together with the fact that {zG) is a subnet of {z~}, imply that {z,: zGzzF,,} is a subnet of (~~1, and hence also converges (in the topology z) to 5. Since z is a vector space topology, this implies that {zG--zrO} converges (in the topology z) to 2-zF,.
Since zc-zF, lies in the z-compact order interval [0, z -zF,], so does Z-zF,. In particular, Zz zFO for each F, in 35
To see that Z= sup (zF} we consider any w in L such that w 2 zF for each F; we must show that w 2 Z. Since w 2 zr for each F, it follows in particular that wzzc for each G in $ and hence (as above) that ~25, as desired. Hence Z= sup {zF}, as asserted.
Finally, since zr= sup {zl: ;1 E F}, it is clear that sup{z,} = sup {zl: 2 e/i), so that (zn} has a supremum. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.2. 0
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We may assume without loss that 0~6 < 1. We set e = Cr= 1 e, and consider the principal order ideal L, = (y E t: -re 2 y 5 re for some integer r}.
According to Schaefer (1974, pp. 102, 104) In what follows, it will be convenient to suppress the isomorphism between L, and C(Q), and simply identify them. We will thus write e,(w) for the value of e, at w, etc. We continue, however, to write Ileill for the norm of ei in L, etc.
Choose any 6' with O<&<min(l/N, 6/l)e\\). Since Q is compact and each function e, bj is continuous (hence uniformly continuous) we can find a covering of R by open sets U,, . . . , U, such that, for each i, j, Jei(w)-ei(w')l<& and lb,(w)-bj(w')( ~6' whenever w, w' belong to the same set U; Let 0, denote the closure of uI, and set Vi = U,, V, = 0, -I',, I', = 0, -(Vi u V,), etc. Since 52 is Stonian, the sets I',,. . . , V, form a cover of 52 by open and closed sets. (We may, without loss, assume that & #O for each 1.) Moreover, for each i, j, Jet(w)-ei(W')I 56' and [b,(w) -bj(w')( 5 6' whenever w, w' belong to the same set V;. Now define K to be the subspace of C(Q)=L, consisting of functions which are constant on each of the sets r/;. It is evident that K is a tinitedimensional vector sublattice of C(Q) =L, (and hence of L). In fact, a basis for K consists of the characteristic functions xv,, 1= 1,2,. . . , k. For each i, j, 1, let cil be the minimum of the continuous function e; on the compact set v, and let dj, be the minimum of bj on r/;. Set The first two inequalities imply that OseF sei and 0s b; 5 bj. The second two inequalities, together with the fact that e(w) = 1 for each w, imply that (e: -ei( 5 6'e and (b? -bj/ s6'e. By the lattice property of the norm (and the fact that 6'(\el( ~6) this yields
IJcT-eill<6 and (Ibj*-bjll<6.
It remains only to show that xe: is strictly positive in K. Equivalently, we must show that for each 1, at least one of the coefficients cil is strictly positive. Fix a point wI in V,. Since e(wJ = 1, there is at least one e, such that ei(w,)z l/N. Since the variation of e, on v is at most 8, this means that cil 2 (l/N) -6' > 0, as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. 0
Proof of the Main Existence Theorem
We begin by isolating parts of the argument as lemmas. The first one will be useful elsewhere, so we establish an appropriately general version; it is closely related to a finite-dimensional result of McKenzie (1959) . If ((xl,. . . , x,) , X) is u quasiequilibrium for E and there is a vector z E L such that 0 5 z 5 c ei and n(z) # 0, then (x,, . . . , xN, n) is actually an equilibrium.
Proof. Let I denote the set of agents i for which there is a vector 5 with 02 5 5 e, and rc([) #O; let J denote the complementary set of agents. We first show that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for all agents in I.
Fix ill and a vector [ with Og[lei and X(C) #O. Let yi~Pi(xI,, . . ,x,); then 7c(yi) z$ei), and we want to show that in fact ~(yJ>n(e,). If a =n(eJ, we distinguish three cases. Case 1. n(eJ > 0. Then ~(ty,) < x(e,) for t < 1, while tyi E Pi(Xl,. . . ) XN) if t is close to 1 (by continuity of P,). This violates the quasi-equilibrium conditions. Case 2. n(e,) <O. Then n(syi) <7c(ei) for s> 1 and SYiEPi(X1,..., x3 for s near 1, again violating the quasi-equilibrium conditions. Case 3. 7c(ei) =O. By continuity of Pi, for all small real numbers r >0 we have yi+reiEPi(xl,..., x,,J. Since Os[je, we know that y,+rei+ r*[ EP,(~~, . . . , xN) provided that lr*/ is sufficiently small (if )r*) <r then yi + rei + r*[ 20). On the other hand, ~(y, + rei + r*[) = r*c) = r*n(Q, and r*n([) ~0 = z(e,) if r* and n(c) have opposite signs. This again violates the quasi-equilibrium conditions. We conclude that the equilibrium conditions hold for all agents in I.
Notice that I is not empty. For, since 0 sz sEei, we may use the Riesz Decomposition Property to write z =c zi with 0 gzis e, for each i. Then n(z) = 1 n(zi) # 0, so n(zJ # 0 for at least one agent i, and this agent belongs to I.
Finally we show that J is empty. For, if not, irreducibility of E guarantees that there is an i~1, a ~EJ and a [EL such that Os[s;ej and xi+ i E pi(xl,.
. .P xN). Since jE.J we know that ~([)=0, so that R(x~+~;)= x(xi) 5 n(e,); this violates the equilibrium conditions just established for agent i. We conclude that J is empty, and hence that (x,, . . . ,xN, TC) is an equilibrium. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.1. 0
Throughout the remainder of this section, we assume that all the hypotheses of the Main Existence Theorem are satisfied (except for irreducibility of the economy 8).
We are going to obtain a quasi-equilibrium for E as a limit of equilibria of subeconomies whose commodity spaces are finite-dimensional vector sublattices of L. Because the family of finite-dimensional vector sublattices L is not directed by inclusion, we need to carry along some extra information. The precise structure we need is an (N + 2)-tuple II= (F,, n,, e;, . . . , e$), where F, is a finite-dimensional vector sublattice of L, n, is a positive integer and et,..., e% are positive elements of F, which satisfy (a) cyZ 1 e: is strictly positive in F,, (b) /jei -eF\) < l/n, for each i, (c) e: 5 e, for each i.
We shall call such an (IV+ 2)-tuple CL a special configuration. (Notice that, since F, is a vector sublattice of L, it follows that cer is a positive element of L, but it need not be strictly positive in L.) The vectors e: will be the initial endowments of our approximating subeconomies. The integers n, will play a role when we make the family of all special configurations into a directed set.
Our first task is to show that many special configurations exist. Given a finite subset A of L+ we cannot generally find a special configuration c1= (F,, n,, 4 ,. . . , ei) with A c F,, but we can come as close as we wish. special configuration a = (F,, n,, e: , . . . , ei) such that l/n, < E and dist(a,FL)=inf{lla-zll: for each j, (3) I;= 1 e: is strictly positive in K.
Then a=(K,s,eT,. . . , eg) is a special configuration. Moreover, for each j, Rb; belongs to K and our choice of bj and the triangle inequality imply that Ilaj-Rbrll <E. Hence the special configuration IX has the required properties, and the proof is complete. 0
We will write D for the set of all special configurations. We wish to use D to index nets of quasi-equilibria; to do so, we must define an ordering on D.
Given two special configurations a =(F,, n,, et,. . . , e$) and b = (FB, nP, e?, . . . , e$), we will write u < /? provided that n, < ns and dist(z, F,+) 5 2-""I[z(( for each z E FL. This relation is not transitive, but it is acyclic; i.e., there is no finite sequence a1, CL~, . . . , ctk of special configurations such that c1r < LQ < . . . < ak < aI (because we cannot have nal -C ne2 .. . -c no, -C n,,) A simple calculation, using (ii), the triangle inequality and the fact that I:= I 2-"= 1, shows that if crsp then dist(z,PB+) 54.sPnullzII for each z E F:. We next show that the partial ordering 5 actually directs the set D. Proof. Since F, and F, are finite-dimensional, their unit spheres are compact.
Hence we can choose finite sets of vectors {x1,. . . ,x,} c F, and I , . . . , yK) c F, such that ((xj(( = 1 for each j; llyk/ = 1 for each k; for ezrh XE F, with IIxII= 1, th ere is an index j with /Ix-xjll <2-2-nu and for each YEF~, with ((y((= 1, there is an index k with ((y-yk((<2-2~n~. We now use Lemma 7.2 to choose a special configuration y such that l/n, < l/(n, + na) (which means nY > n, + n,), dist(xj, F:) ~2-'~- ' for each j and dist(y,, F:) < 2-nfi-2 for each k. Since the norm of F,, is positively homogeneous, the triangle inequality and our choice of {x1,. . . , xJ> and {Y r,. . . , yK} imply that dist(x, F:) ~2-null~ll for each XE F,+ and dist(y, F:) 5 2-"fl1/yll for each ~EF+~. Thus a<y and PC y; in particular, azy and flzy, as desired. 0
With all of the preliminary constructions out of the way, we now turn to the main argument.
Proof of the Main Existence Theorem.
For each special configuration a= (F,,n,,e",,..., ei) we define consumption sets Xq and preference relations p;: n X7 + 2xp by 'Any acyclic relation may always be extended to a reflexive, antisymmetric transitive relation by exactly this procedure.
PT(x 1,...,XN)=Pi(X1,...,XN)nF,.
We set E" = ((XT, P;,ef)]; this is an economy in the finite-dimensional vector sublattice F, of L. The next step is to find extemely desirable commodities.
For each i, fix a vector ui E L+ which is extremely desirable (on the set &) for consumer i. For each CY, the distance from vi to F,+ is acutally taken on (since F, is finite-dimensional);
i.e., we can choose vectors up in F, so that llvf-u,ll= inf{((z-vJl:zE F,+j.
For any E >O, we can use Lemma 7.2 to find a special configuration c( such that ((I$-i/( f u <E or each i. On the other hand, the properties of our ordering require that dist(z$, Fl) 54. 2-""~~u~~~ 5 4. 2-"a(\\~i// + E). whenever bz CL. Hence there is a vector in Fl whose distance to ui is at most 4. 2P"a(lluill +E) x E. The definition of I$ now yields that whenever /?~cc. We conclude that, for each i, IlVr-UiII tends to 0 along the directed set D of special configurations. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.2 that (for each i), VT is extremely desirable for consumer i (on the set A), provided y is sufficiently large. Since u[ bellongs to F:, it is certainly extremely desirable for consumer i on A A FJ, which includes the set of feasible allocations for the economy E' (provided that y is sufficiently large). We now want to apply the equilibrium existence result of Shafer (1976, Theorem 2 and Remarks) to conclude that each of the economies Ey has a quasi-equilibrium (x7,. . . , x);;p'), for y sufficiently large. To do so, we first note that the existence of extremely desirable commodities implies that preferences are locally non-satiated on the set of feasible allocations. Shafer's continuity assumptions follow from continuity of the preferences Pi, together with the fact that all Hausdorff vector space topologies on a finitedimensional vector space coincide. The remaining conditions of Shafer's Theorem are easily verified, except for the requirement that the initial endowments lie in the interiors of the consumption sets. To remedy this small difficulty, we choose a real number t with 0~ t < 1 and define new endowments These new endowments do lie in the interiors of the consumption sets, so the economy with these endowments has an equilibrium (note that 2 ft=Cej').
Letting t tend to zero and taking limits yields our quasi-equilibrium (G,. . . , xl;;p'). The price py belongs to Fk, and there is no loss in assuming that I(@'([ = 1. The Hahn-Banach Theorem now provides an element rcy of L' which has norm one, and agrees with py on F, We have thus constructed a net ((xi,. . . , x$;nY)) in L x L '.. x L x L'. Since O~~xy =xey se for each y, the vectors XT all belong to the order interval {O,e], which is z-compact. Moreover, since llltyll = 1, the functionals rcy all belong to the unit ball of L', which is weak-star compact. Hence, passing to a subnet if necessary, we obtain vectors X,, . . . , X, in (0, e] and a functional 5 in L' such that {xj') converges to Xi (in the topology T) and {rc'> converges to C (in the weak-star topology). Note that ll?Cllz 1.
We are now going to show that (X1,. . . , XN;71) is a quasi-equilibrium for C. Our first task is to show that ii is not the zero functional; as we have emphasized, this is the crucial point. To do this, we first recall that IJv;-t+(( tends to zero, for each i, so that {+'(u;)) converges to %(uJ, for each i (by Lemma A of the appendix). The Price Lemma gives us an estimate involving the rry(viy), namely
provided that we compute marginal rates of desirability in the economy 27. However, let us note that rcy(u~)20 (since UT is extremely desirable and rcy is a quasi-equilibrium price) and that marginal rates of desirability certainly do not increase if we compute them in E rather than in EY. Hence the inequality (*) is valid if we compute marginal rates of desirability in the economy E. Let us write ,ni = inf(pi(vi, (xl,. . . , XN) ): (xl,. . . , XN) Ed}.
By extreme desirability, ,ni > 0. By Lemma 4.3, As we have already noted, ~~ui-uj'~l tends to 0. If we combine this fact with the inequality (*) and our previous observation that {?'(uj')} converges to 5(ui), we obtain N ?qUi) c-2 1.
i=l Pi
In particular, 71 is not the zero functional.
We now proceed to verify the quasi-equilibrium conditions. The argument is similar to Bewley's (1974) , but more complicated, since the endowments er may differ from the endowments e,. First of all, we know that xx! =xeT for each y. By construction.
the endowments e; converge to e, in the norm topology and hence in the topology r (which is weaker than the norm topology). Since the vectors x! converge to Xi in the topology z, and z is a vector space topology we conclude that xXi=Cei.
NOW let US suppose that yi~Pi(X,, . . . , TN) snd that 5(yi) < 71(ei). Proceeding exactly as in the construction of extremely desirable commodities, we find vectors yy E FY+ such that lly [-yi(( tends to 0 (with y) . Since the preference relation Pi is (7, norm)-continuous, we conclude that yy E Pi(x:, . . . , xi) if y is large enough. Since the vectors in question all belong to F,, it follows that yy ~P/"(xl,. . . ,xi;). On the other hand, since llyy-yill and Ile-e,ll both tend to 0 (with y), and {z'} converges to 2 in the weak-star topology, we may apply Lemma A of the appendix again to conclude that rcY(yr) <nY(ey) for y sufficiently large. Since yl E Pj(x:, . . .,x,&) for large y, this contradicts the fact that (XI,... ,X&T 9) is a quasi-equilibrium for 0. We conclude that, if yi E P,(X,, . . . , XN), then ~(yi)z 7t(eJ.
Finally, we need to show that ?2(Xi) =?2(ei) for each i. But if 71(Xi) # E(eJ for some i, we must have rr(xJ < $ej) for some j, since ~~~=~e,.
On the other hand, Xj+ ~IJ~E Pj(X,, . . . , XN) for each t >O (since vj is extremely desirable) and %(Xj + tvj) < $ej) for t sufficiently small (since $xj) < $ej)). This contradicts the conclusion of the previous paragraph. This completes the proof that (X1,. . . , X,, ~7) is a quasi-equilibrium.
It remains to show that, when E is irreducible, every quasi-equilibrium (6,. . .3 xR;n*) is actually an equilibrium. Since n* is a non-zero price, n*(z) #0 for some positive z. Since e is strictly positive, [l(ne A z)-z(( is small provided n is large. Hence rc*(ne~ z)#O, so that rc*(l/n)(ne AZ)#O while (I/n)(ne A z) se; Lemma 7.1 now implies that (XT,. . . , xc, n*) is actually an equilibrium.
This completes the proof.
q It is worth noting that, by the same argument, we can show that the set of all quasi-equilibria (X1,. . . ,x,;%)
, where we give L the topology z and L' the weak-star topology. (Of course, if E is irreducible, the set of equilibria is compact, since it coincides with the set of quasi-equilibria.)
Concluding remarks
Remark 1. Throughout, we have assumed that the consumption set of each agent is the positive cone L+. An examination of the proof will show, however, that it works equally well for (some) other consumption sets. For example, it would suffice to assume that the consumption set Xi of the ith agent has the properties: (a) Xi is a closed, convex subset of L+ containing 0, (b) Xi is solid (i.e., if x E Xi then the order interval [O, x] is contained in Xi), (c) if x E Xi then x + tvi E Xi for some t >O.
Remark 2. Much of our analysis should go through in the context of a countable number of agents, provided the commodity space is I, or L,. For more general commodity spaces, there seem to be additional serious difficulties. (See the Remark in section 5.) Remark 3. Notice that, in the proofs of the Main Existence Theorem, the Price Lemma and Theorem 6.1, completeness of the norm of L was never used. The Main Existence Theorem therefore remains valid for incomplete normed vector lattices.
Remark 4. As we noted in section 4, the requirement that the aggregate initial endowment be strictly positive rules out the commodity space M(Q), which has no strictly positive elements. However, our results can be extended to this case, if we strengthen the extreme desirability assumption slightly. Here is a sketch:
We will assume that for each consumer i, there is a commodity ui which belongs to the order interval [O,e] The Banach space is a normed vector space for which the metric induced by the norm is complete.
If E is a Banach space, then its dual space E' is a set of continuous linear functionals on E. The dual space E' is itself a Banach space, when equipped with the norm ((4(\ = sup $#4x)l:x~E, llxll5 11.
In addition to the norm topologies on E and E', we shall make use of three other topologies. The weak topology a(E,E') on E is the topology of pointwise convergence when we regard elements of E as functionals on E'. That is, a net {xa> in E converges weakly to an element x E E exactly when {f(xJ} converges to f(x) or each GEE'. Similarly, the weak-star topology o(E', E) on E' is the topology of pointwise convergence when we regard elements of E' as functionals on E. Thus f, -+ f in the weak-star topology means that f,(x)-](x) for each XE E. Finally, the Mackey topology e(E', E) on E' is the topology of uniform convergence on weakly compact, convex, symmetric, subsets of E.
It is a consequence of the Separation Theorem that the weak and norm topologies on E have the same closed convex sets and the same continuous linear functionals. The Mackey-Arens Theorem asserts that the weak-star and Mackey topologies on E' have the same closed convex sets and the same continuous linear functionals, and that the Mackey topology is the strongest locally convex vector space topology on E' with this property. By viewing elements of E as linear functionals on E' we obtain a canonical injection of E into E" and we may identify E as the subspace of weak-star continuous linear functionals on E'.
Alaoglu's Theorem asserts that the closed unit ball of E' (and hence every weak-star closed, norm bounded set) is weak-star compact. Hence every net {z,} in the ball of E' has a convergent/subnet. As a final comment, let us note for further use the following elementary lemma: Recall that a Banach lattice is a Banach space L endowed with a partial order 5 (i.e., 5 is a reflexive, antisymmetric, transmitive relation) satisfying:
(1) xzy implies x+zsy+z (for all x,y,z~L), (2) x 5 y implies tx 5 ty (for all x, y, E L, all real numbers t 2 0), (3) every pair of elements x, y E L has a supremum (least upper bound) x v y and an inlimum (greatest lower bound) x A y, (4) 1x1 s(y( implies ((x(( 5 ((y(( (for all x, ye L) .
Here we have written, as usual, [xl= x++x-where x+=xvO, x-=(-x)vO; we call x+, x-the positive and negative parts of x (respectively) and 1x1 the absolute value of x. We recall that x=x+ -x-, and that x+ A x-=O. We say that XE L is positive if x20; we write L+ for the set of all positive elements of L and refer to Lf as the positive cone of L.
The Banach lattice structure on L induces on the dual space L' the structure of a Banach lattice, where f gg in L' means f(x)<g(x) for each
If x is a positive element of L, then by the order interval [0,x] we mean the set In any Banach lattice L, order intervals are norm closed (and thus weakly closed), convex and bounded.
If L is a dual lattice, order intervals are also weak-star closed (and thus weak-star compact).
We shall say that an element x of L is strictly positive (and write x>>O) if 4(x)>O whenever C#J is a positive non-zero element of L+. (Strictly positive elements are sometimes called quasi-interior to L+.) An equivalent characterization is that the element x in L is strictly positive if and only if the sequence (nx A y} converges in norm to y (as n tends to infinity) for each y in L+. We note that if the positive cone L+ of L has a non-empty (norm) interior, then the set of strictly positive elements coincides with the interior of L+. However, many Banach lattices contain strictly positive elements even though the positive cone L+ has an empty interior.
Basic examples of Banach lattices include:
the Euclidean space RN, (ii) the space 1 (for 1 sp< 00) of real sequences (a,) for which the norm lJ(a,)lJ,=(Cfa,JP)l'P is finite, (iii) the space L,(Q, R,p) of measurable functions f on the measure space (Q. R,m) for which the norm ~~f(~p=(jn~~~Pd~)l~p is finite (as usual, we identify two functions if they agree almost everywhere), (iv) the space 1, of bounded real sequences (with the supremum norm), 
